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ABSTRACT 
 
Is democracy favorable or adverse for the environment? While some studies find democracy to 
increase the likelihood of achieving sustainable development, others propose that democracy rather 
has negative effects on the environment. This paper contributes explicitly to this debate, but also 
adds insights from research arguing that the effects of democracy are conditioned by surrounding 
institutions. More specifically, building on this literature, we argue that the way democracy works – 
whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environment or an instrument for 
patronage and clientelism – depends on levels of economic development. The overall objective of 
the article is to test this proposition empirically. Using the Marine Trophic Index as a proxy for 
overfishing, we investigate the impact of democracy on the health of the marine environment in a 
global sample from 1972 to 2006. The analysis provides interesting insights regarding the condi-
tional role of economic development. We report negative effects of democracy in settings of low 
gross national income, while this pattern is reversed when economic development has reached a 
certain threshold. Finally, we discuss how democracy affects the prospects for sustainable devel-
opment and based on our conclusions offer suggestions for future studies in this field of research. 
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Introduction 
In a growing body of literature, scholars debate the effect of democracy on environmental degrada-
tion. While some studies find democracy to increase the likelihood of, e.g., sustainable develop-
ment, others claim that democracy has negative effects, alternatively only appears to have positive 
effects on the management of some specific resources (Scruggs, 2009; Li and Reuveny, 2006; Mid-
larsky, 1998; Arvin and Lew, 2011).  
This article, however, argues that the debate over democracy’s virtuous or vicious effects 
may be partly misinformed. More specifically, we assert that there are substantial reasons to believe 
that the effect of democracy on the environment is fundamentally conditioned by level of econom-
ic development. This proposition originates from the literature on modernization and democratic 
consolidation, where it is typically argued that in societies lacking economic development, the gov-
ernance logic is quite different from that in more affluent countries (Leftwich, 1993; Collier, 2009; 
Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Keefer, 2007; Zakaria, 2003; Lipset, 1959). Accordingly, if not pre-
ceded or accompanied by institutions that generate economic development (such as rule of law and 
the protection of property rights), the instrumental mechanisms of democracy cannot be expected 
to automatically strengthen collective action, civil society, political culture, or other factors held to 
be indispensable to foster accountability, political participation, and, in the end, sustainable devel-
opment. Without such complementary institutions there are serious concerns that democracy in 
many cases may be no more than an empty shell, in fact potentially opening up yet other arenas for 
exploitation, patronage, and clientelism (Collier, 2009, 2007; Keefer 2007; Walker 1999). This ar-
gument also highlights the importance of sequencing. While democracy in the well-developed parts 
of the world was commonly preceded by rule of law and constitutional liberalism, many of today’s 
developing states are forced to complete the construction of the modern state project while at the 
same time competing in general elections (Zakaria, 2003; Collier, 2009; Diamond, 2008; Persson 
and Sjöstedt, 2010). Moreover, in low-income settings, democracy is often imposed from outside, 
implying that there might be severe legitimacy problems and little correspondence between formal 
and informal institutions, which in turn might imply that democracy does not have as positive ef-
fects in low-income settings as in more affluent societies (see Bratton, 2008; Helmke and Levitsky, 
2006; Pritchett and Woolcock, 2004). 
Taken together, there are substantial reasons to believe that the way democracy works – 
i.e., whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environment or an instrument 
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for patronage, clientelism, and redistribution to the ruler’s closest allies – depends on level of eco-
nomic development.  
The aim of this paper is to investigate whether level of democracy affects the marine environment and, if so, 
whether this impact differs depending on national levels of economic development.   
In order to test the relationship between democracy and the marine environment empiri-
cally, we use the Marine Trophic Index as a proxy for overfishing and available data measuring 
democracy as the independent variable. The empirical analysis is in many ways more ambitious than 
previous tests in the literature, with a sample of 148 countries and the health of their marine envi-
ronment over the years 1972-2006. Hence, we have a larger sample size across both more countries 
and years than normally used in this literature. Our findings provide interesting insights regarding 
the conditional role of development, thus developing the claim recently made by Scruggs (2009), 
arguing that previous studies have not adequately taken into account the role of economic devel-
opment. We report negative effects of democracy in settings of low gross national income and 
positive effects when economic development has reached a certain threshold. Moreover, we con-
tribute by adding knowledge of when democracy can be expected to generate positive environmental 
outcomes. 
The remaining article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explore the theoretical ori-
gins of our argument and provide an overview of the debate over the relationship between democ-
racy and the environment. Section 3 specifies the empirical model and spells out the methodologi-
cal considerations. The statistical analysis then follows in Section 4 and, finally, Section 5 provides 
conclusions and implications. 
 
Theoretical framework 
The effect of democracy on the environment is heavily debated. While some scholars argue that 
democracy increases the likelihood of successful collective action and sustainable development, 
others hold that democratic systems tend to fall prey to the public’s unwillingness to adopt envi-
ronmentally sound policies. According to the latter perspective, democracy either needs to be ex-
changed for a more authoritarian political system with the capacity to reorient society away from 
unsustainable development paths (Ophuls, 1977; Heilbronner, 1974; also see Paehlke, 1995) or 
should be guided by more deliberative and participatory ideals (Dryzek, 1987, 1992; Folke et al., 
2003; Nadasty, 2007). The scholars holding that democracy is beneficial for the environment in-
stead tend to argue that democracy is an efficient coordination mechanism and that democratic 
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values and procedures, e.g., freedom of speech and freedom of information, increase the likelihood 
of sustainable development (Achterberg, 1993; Lafferty and Meadowcroft, 1995; Barrett and Grad-
dy, 2000; Jagers 2007).  
The arguments proposed in this debate are as contrasting as compelling. Li and Reuveny 
(2006) list five causal mechanisms for why democracy might improve environmental performance: 1) 
political rights and freedom will often lead to public awareness and environmental action, 2) sys-
tems with electoral accountability will be more responsive to the influence on policy from envi-
ronmentalists, 3) due to the dominating principles of rule of law, aversion to war and respect for 
life, democracies tend to produce less environmental destruction than autocracies, 4) the elite in an 
autocratic society will be less pro-environmental than the public mass, and 5) relatively short time 
horizons of autocratic leaders will tend to promote overexploitation. Moreover, though, the same 
authors also list four mechanisms for why democracy may worsen environmental degradation: 1) the 
(unlimited) freedom in a democracy will lead to unchecked behavior by overharvesting individuals, 
2) autocracies can impose strict regulations on population growth, 3) democracies are often market 
economies where corporate interests have more influence than environmentalists, and 4) in democ-
racies leaders will enact election-winning policies and thus tend to promote policies supporting the 
employment of voters rather than the environment.  
This debate has spurred numerous empirical investigations studying the relationship be-
tween the level of democracy and the quality of the environment. While some studies indicate a 
positive correlation between democracy and environmental quality (Neumayer, 2002; Li and Reu-
veny, 2006; Wurster, 2011; Jagers and Sjöstedt 2011), others find negative correlations or no rela-
tionship at all (Midlarsky, 1998). For example, Li and Reuveny’s (2006) find that higher levels of 
democracy reduce CO2 and NOx emissions and lead to less water pollution, less land degradation, 
and lower deforestation rates. In a comprehensive overview of this growing literature, Scruggs 
(2009) finds 58 published studies that directly deal with the impact of democracy on measures of 
environmental performance. When performing an empirical test of these propositions, the author, 
interestingly, points to the role of economic development: “[Our results] raise doubts about the 
environmental efficacy of democracy. The limited evidence that we do find to support a positive 
democratic effect is accounted for more by economic change (specifically the collapse of the East-
ern bloc), not political liberalization. Economic wealth and the speed of economic growth (or de-
cline) have the most consistent impact on environmental performance” (Scruggs, 2009:2). 
When it comes to the relationship between economic development and the environment, 
empirical findings are equally confused and conflicting. The well-known Environmental Kuznets 
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Curve, named after S. Kuznets’ proposed inverted U-shaped pattern between income inequality and 
economic growth (Kuznets, 1955, 1965, 1966), has been the subject of substantial debate and scru-
tiny. Yet, research is still far from reaching consensus over its validity. An inverted U-shaped rela-
tionship between economic development and the environment was for example found in cross-
country studies of air pollution, such as CO2, NOx, and SO2, as well as of energy use, clean water, 
urban sanitation, nitrates, suspended particulate matter, waste, and deforestation (Shafik and Ban-
dyopadhyay, 1992; Cole Rayner and Bates, 1997; Galeotti and Lanza, 1999; Panayotou Sachs and 
Peterson, 1999; Bhattarai and Hammig, 2000; Kallbekken, 2000; Ehrhardt-Martinez et al., 2002). At 
the same time, a number of studies have demonstrated an N-shaped pattern for the relationship 
between income and CO2, NOx, SO2, and smoke (Grossman and Krueger, 1993, 1995; Selden and 
Song, 1994). Moreover, scholars have discovered a linear logarithmic pattern, implying that an in-
crease in emissions is strongly correlated with income, but that further improvements in environ-
mental quality does not necessarily depend on further economic growth (Bruyn, Bergh and Op-
schoor, 1998). Other scholars instead address the issue of reverse causality, assuming that it is envi-
ronmental degradation that causes income to decrease (Stern et al., 1996), since economic activities 
depend on environmental resources and that their unsustainable use “reduce[s] the capacity of gen-
erating material production in the future” (Arrow et al., 1995).  
 Taken together, the effects of democracy on the environment, as well as the effects of economic devel-
opment on the environment, or even the effects of democracy on economic development and vice versa, are obviously 
subjects of considerable controversy and disagreement. In an attempt to contribute to these research fields, we set out to 
perform a more fine-grained empirical analysis, including levels of economic development and democracy in a joint 
analysis. Taking a departure in the discussion on causal mechanisms by Li and Reuveny (2006), we 
argue that there are reasons to believe that these mechanisms function differently depending on 
surrounding institutions and especially levels of economic development. The five mechanisms of 
positive impact of democracy might be more functioning when economic development is high. 
Conversely, the four negative effects of democracy might very well be better functioning when 
economic development is low. In order to develop this argument, we are theoretically informed by the 
well-established – yet in this context partly overlooked – literature on modernization and democratic consolidation. 
This literature holds that low-income settings per definition lack institutions stimulating economic 
development, and that in the absence of such institutions democracy might be a less effective way 
to govern. In short, if not preceded by a constitution, rule of law or secure property rights generat-
ing economic development, democracy does not necessarily function as an instrument of collective 
action, but rather risks being used as an instrument of patronage and clientelism (Leftwich, 1993; 
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Zakaria, 2003; Keefer, 2007; Walker, 1999, Diamond 2008, 2007). Moreover, in low-income set-
tings, democracy is often imposed from abroad, lacking legitimacy and correspondence between 
informal and formal institutions, which induces leaders to act for their short-term survival rather 
than engaging in the provisioning of long-term public goods such as protection of the environment. 
This in turn makes the legitimacy of the system decrease even more. In addition, without welfare 
improvements, citizens tend to distrust the democratic system and risk ending up engaging in pat-
ronage and clientelism themselves (Collier, 2009; Kapstein and Converse, 2008; Keefer 2007). In 
sum, this literature holds that the workings of democracy differ significantly depending on levels of economic in-
come, and if democracy does not deliver, its positive effects as an instrument for collective action will 
hence be absent. We thus have reason to believe that the causal mechanisms discussed by Li and 
Reuveny (2006) are in fact conditioned by democratic consolidation, and more specifically, the 
institutional arrangements prevailing at different levels of economic development.  
 
The case of marine resources 
A focus on marine resources when investigating the effect of democracy during different stages of 
economic development is appropriate in many respects. For example, being a fungible natural re-
source, it accentuates many of the governance challenges associated with common pool resources 
(Ostrom, 1990). Fisheries are in fact often used as textbook illustrations of common pool resource 
problems and the importance of collective action mechanisms such as democracy or other govern-
ance arrangements. Yet, empirical studies on the effect of democracy on the marine environment 
are scant, and demonstrate conflicting results (Jagers and Sjöstedt, 2011). Similarly, the effect of 
economic development on marine resources is far from settled empirically. In a study on the rela-
tionship between income and marine resource exploitation in Turkey over time, Kamanlioglu 
(2011) finds an inverted N-shaped relationship between the deterioration of marine environmental 
quality and economic growth. However, the author points out that such a pattern is shaped by 
country-specific factors.  Sabah (2011), on the other hand, finds an N-shaped relationship between 
economic development and coral reef bleaching. Clausen and York (2008a, 2008b) report, however, 
that the rise of per capita income leads to the decline of the marine trophic level, without further 
improvement of the indicator at higher income levels. 
In the next section, we further specify how we proceed in testing the impact of democra-
cy and economic development on the marine environment.  
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The investigation 
The health of marine ecosystems is determined by various factors in a complex and interlinked 
system (UN-DESA 2008). More specifically, in order to operationalize this concept, we use a well-
established indicator, the Marine Trophic Index (MTI). This measurement captures to what extent 
countries “fish down the food chain” within their exclusive economic zones. Pressure on fisheries 
from harvesting tends to affect fish at the top of the food chain as humans often target larger pred-
atory fishes (Pauly 2005; Pauly and Watson, 2005; Pauly and Palomares, 2005). The MTI is calculat-
ed by assigning a number to each species according to its location in the food chain, where carni-
vores receive higher and herbivores receive lower numbers. The measure averages the trophic levels 
from the overall catch, based on a dataset of commercial fish landing compiled by the Food and 
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO). Lower values of the index mean that 
catches consist of smaller fish. A negative trend in this measurement is thus a proxy measure for 
overfishing and that “fisheries are not being sustainably managed” (Sea Around Us, 2011). Over-
fishing affects the marine ecosystem health as overexploited fish stocks lead to the loss of biodiver-
sity and ecosystems stability. The index has been criticized for not adequately reflecting the true 
situation in marine ecosystems as it is built on the catches of commercial species, excluding the 
impact of unregistered fishing (Branch et al., 2010; Caddy et al., 1998). However, there exist few 
alternative measures of overfishing. The MTI is widely used by researchers and remains the most 
well-established measure for marine trophic stability across countries and time (Clausen and York, 
2008a; Emerson et al., 2010; Pauly and Watson; 2005). The MTI is also considered to be “a meas-
ure for overall ecosystem health and stability” and was included as such in the 2010 Environmental 
Performance Index (Emerson et al., 2010).  
In order to measure the main independent variable of the study, i.e., the degree of democ-
racy in a country at a given point in time, we use one of the most established regime type indicators 
– the Freedom House/Polity index. This index reflects two important composites of regimes – 
political rights and civil liberties (Freedom House, 2010). Political rights measure whether elections 
in the country are free and fair, whether political rights are equal to all members of the society and 
the competitiveness of political participation. The civil liberties value includes an assessment of 
freedom of the press, of academic freedom, of freedom of public and private discussions, of free-
dom for NGOs’ operations, of rule of law, of an independent judiciary and other relevant aspects 
(Lonardo, 2011). The average value of political rights and civil liberties in turn serves as an approx-
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imation of the level of democracy in a country. In the present study we will use an imputed version 
of this index, designed especially for time-series analysis, covering a broader sample using imputed 
values for the cases where data was initially missing. The imputed version of the index is available 
for the period 1972-2009 and varies from 0 to 10, where 10 corresponds to the most democratic 
regimes (Teorell et al., 2011).  
Following the reasoning of, for example, Li and Reuveny (2006), we include a measure of a 
country’s openness to and engagement in world trade as a control variable. A country’s openness to 
world trade is held to relate to environmental outcomes in several ways. For example, it has been 
argued that trade and globalization encourages establishment of higher environmental standards 
according to the demands from markets and also promotes technologies and innovations of a high-
er standard (Esty and Gentry, 1997; Vogel, 1995; Porter and Linde, 1995; Braithwaite and Drahos, 
2000). However, others have argued in line with the hypotheses of the “race to the bottom,” hold-
ing that countries fearing to lose competitiveness will dismantle environmental standards (Sheldon, 
2006). In addition, Daly (1993) and Meadows et al. (1972) conclude that trade has negative effects 
on the environment, since it raises production levels and GDP, which in turn negatively affects the 
environment. Indeed, empirical investigations show both positive (Frankel and Rose, 2005; Antwei-
ler et al., 2001) and negative (e.g., Managi, 2004) correlations between openness to trade and envi-
ronmental quality and they also find different effects of trade openness on different pollutants be-
tween country groups (Managi et al., 2008). The indicator of openness to trade is taken from Penn 
World Trade (Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009), and measures total trade as a percentage of GDP 
in constant 2005 prices. The data covers the years 1950-2007. The variable required log-
transformation to correct for its skewed distribution. 
In addition, following Delgado et al. (2003), who discuss the impact from growing human 
populations on the pressure put on fisheries, we include a control variable for the size of a coun-
try’s population. The data on population is taken from the World Bank database for the years 1971-
2010, and is measured in numbers of inhabitants. The variable is logarithmically transformed due to 
its skewed distribution. 
Of all the gears used in harvesting marine fish resources, bottom trawls and dredges are 
recognized as considered to be the most destructive ones (Watson et al., 2004, 2006). They cause 
chronic disturbances in coastal waters and lead to changes in trophic structures (Jennings et al., 
2001). We therefore include a control for trawling intensity in our analysis. We use the Coastal Shelf 
Fishing Pressure Index, developed by the Environment Performance Index (2012). The index 
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measures intensity of gears operating in the coastal waters. The unit of measurement is metric tons 
of catch from trawling and dredging gears in a country for a given time divided by the area of its 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in square km. The data is available for 1950-2006. Due to its 
skewed distribution, the variable is logarithmically transformed.  
Following our theoretical argument of the impact of democracy on environmental perfor-
mance at different stages of economic development, we want to control for national income levels 
at a given time. The measure we use is real GDP per capita in constant 2005 prices, chain series 
(Heston, Summers and Aten, 2009). Chain series remove effects from price changes and include 
only the values of production volumes, which is very useful for the time-series analysis (Teorell et 
al., 2011). The indicator is available from 1950 to 2007 and is log-transformed due to its skewed 
distribution.  
In order to model different stages of economic development for countries, we divide na-
tions at different points in time into groups according to their gross national income (GNI) per 
capita, following the World Bank methodology (World Bank, 2011). Low-income countries have a 
GNI below $1,005 per capita, lower middle-income countries have a GNI between $1,006 and 
$3,975 per capita, upper middle-income countries have a GNI between $3,976 and $12,275 per 
capita, and high-income countries have a GNI above $12,276 per capita (World Bank, 2011). GNI 
per capita is calculated with the World Bank Atlas Method, which allows for smoothing exchange 
rate fluctuations when comparing countries. This measure does not account for “welfare and suc-
cess in development,” but is recognized as “the best single indicator of economic capacity and pro-
gress" (World Bank, 2011).  
 
Specification and methodology 
In order to model the impact of our independent variables on changes in MTI across countries and 
years, we use time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) analysis. Since we are interested in changes of 
trophic levels and not the absolute levels as such, the dependent variable is here measured as the 
first difference of MTI instead of annual values.  
We make sure to deal with problems inherent to TSCS data. The Hausman test confirms 
the existence of unobserved unit heterogeneity, indicating that country-specific effects are correlat-
ed with our independent variables. This implies that a random effects model will be inconsistent 
when applied to our data and confirms the necessity to use a fixed effects model for correct estima-
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tion (Greene, 1997). A Dickey-Fuller test for a unit root in a time series sample shows that our data 
is stationary. Potential autocorrelation of the data is initially dealt with by using the first difference 
of MTI. The Wooldridge-Drukker test confirms that autocorrelation disappears after performing 
differencing of the dependent variable. 
In order to make sure that independent variables are measured before the change in the 
dependent variable takes place, we use a one-year lag of all the independent variables in our models.  
We use one-year lags in combination with the first differencing of the dependent variable, as used 
by Bohrnstedt (1969, cited in Liker, 1985, p.87).  
As mentioned, the raw data of openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and trawling 
intensity required logarithmic transformation before inclusion into the model due to skewed distri-
bution. Based on the discussion above and after the necessary adjustments to our model, our final 
specification can be presented in the following equation: 
 
                                                                       ; 
 
where i corresponds to each country in the sample and t refers to the year. 
 and corresponds to the change in the marine trophic index for a 
given country in a given year,  is an intercept term for i, (j=1,2,3,4,5) denotes the coefficients 
to be estimated,  is a Freedom House/Polity index for democracy for a given country in a giv-
en year, Oit is openness to trade (country, year), Pit stands for population (country, year), Git refers to 
real GDP per capita for a certain country in a given year,  is trawling intensity in the EEZ of 
each country per year, and  is an error term for each unit of analysis.  
The equation will be estimated using generalized least squares (GLS) with a fixed effect and 
robust standard errors per country and per year (Wooldridge, 2002). An alternative way to estimate 
the equation would be to use OLS regressions with panel-corrected standard errors as suggested by 
Beck and Katz (1995). However, taking into account the necessity to include fixed-effects estima-
tion into our model and control for significant but unobservable unit-specific effects, we have to 
give preference to the GLS regression, since introducing fixed-effects specification into Beck and 
Katz’s model in our case is problematic. 
The MTI assigns values for each major marine coast or island colony of a nation. For this 
reason some problems arose in our analysis, since our independent variables are measured at the 
national level and are not available specifically for coastal regions or island colonies of a nation. 
1,  tiitit MTIMTIMTI
i j
itD
itT
it
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Hence, seven countries (the U.S., Turkey, Indonesia, Malaysia, Japan, Saudi Arabia, and Russia) 
have several MTI scores – one for each of their coastlines  - while having only one national value of 
independent variables to correspond to them. This is also the case for sixty-seven island-colonies, 
where MTI values are available but there are no corresponding values of the independent variables. 
We therefore chose to exclude these cases from the analysis. In doing so, considerable variance in 
our dependent variable is lost, but we still consider our strategy of excluding cases a safer option 
than alternative approaches. An alternative strategy would have been to average the values of MTI 
for countries with several coastlines in order to obtain a single national score for the dependent 
variable to correspond with other variables. Another strategy would have been to impute data for 
independent variables to the regions or islands-colonies with no regional measures. However, both 
of these other strategies have obvious problems. The strategy of creating average values of MTI for 
coastal regions would distort the data. The strategy of imputing data for the coastal regions or col-
onies, might not correspond to reality and may thus produce misleading results. 
The results presented in the next section follow the model described above. However, we 
also performed a number of alternative estimations. We tested several lag structures. Using differ-
ent lags of the independent variables in time indicated that the one-year lag produced the most 
significant results. Since previous studies found a U-shaped relationship between GDP and envi-
ronmental outcomes (e.g., Grossman and Kreuger, 1993, 1995) as well as between democratic de-
velopment and environment (e.g., Buitenzorgy and Ancev, 2011), we also tried a similar model but 
with squared values of those variables included. However, the results were similar to those present-
ed in the tables. Granger causality testing seems to confirm that no reversed causality exists be-
tween our dependent and independent variables.  
 
Results and analysis 
In this section we empirically explore the relationship between levels of democracy and annual 
changes in the marine trophic index during different stages of economic development. We first 
apply our equation to the whole sample to investigate the relationship between our variables of 
interest on the global scale and across time. In order to find out whether democracy exerts an influ-
ence on the changes in marine trophic levels during different stages of economic development, we 
then explore this relationship in different income groups. 
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Table 1 presents the results from our multivariate model on the global sample over all 
available years. The unit of analysis is country-year and the sample includes 142 marine coastal 
states over the years 1972-2006. The analysis shows that democracy is significantly and negatively 
correlated with changes in marine trophic levels. According to this pattern, less democratic coun-
tries tend to have less healthy marine ecosystems. However, when we proceed to divide countries 
based on their income, we can note some more detailed trends, not visible in the first analysis. 
 
TABLE 1. THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY ON CHANGES IN MARINE TROPHIC LEVELS  
DV: Differenced MTI Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 
     Democracy -0.00220** -0.00226** -0.00301*** -0.00298*** -0.00269** 
 
 
(0.000792) (0.000774) (0.000854) (0.000845) (0.000907) 
Openness to trade  0.00218 0.000177 0.00111 -0.00334 
 
 
 (0.00505) (0.00480) (0.00590) (0.00715) 
Population   0.0196* 0.0199* 0.0210* 
 
 
  (0.00779) (0.00789) (0.00818) 
GDP per capita    -0.00329 -0.00345 
 
 
   (0.00741) (0.00660) 
Trawling intensity     0.00314 
 
    (0.00290) 
Constant 0.0122** 0.00338 -0.284* -0.263* -0.251* 
 
(0.00447) (0.0213) (0.123) (0.122) (0.125) 
 
     
Observations 4,255 4,133 4,100 4,100 4,015 
R-squared 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003 
Number of countries 142 138 137 137 137 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Groups are divided based on GNI per capita in 
2010 constant US dollars. All the independent variables are lagged 1 year. Openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and 
trawling intensity are log-transformed. 
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Table 2 reports our findings related to the impact of democracy on the changes in marine 
trophic levels throughout the countries’ economic development. We aim at finding different 
thresholds of economic development where countries display different effects of democracy on the 
changes in MTI. We keep the classification from the World Bank of low-, lower middle-, upper 
middle-, and high-income countries, but also aim to show differences within these categories 
(World Bank, 2011). A full list of countries and years when they are included in each of the groups 
is available in Appendix 1.   
 
 
TABLE 2. THE INFLUENCE OF DEMOCRACY ON CHANGES IN MARINE TROPHIC LEVELS 
THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRIES’ ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES 
DV: Differenced MTI 
Low-income coun-
tries 
Lower middle-income countries 
Upper middle-
income countries 
High income-countries 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
GNI/c<$1005 
$1005< GNI/c 
<$2000 
$2000< GNI/c 
<$3975 
$3975<GNI/c 
<$12275 
$12275< 
GNI/c 
<$20000 
GNI/c> 
$20000 
       Democracy -0.00170 -0.0121*** -0.00293 0.00679 0.00422 0.0749** 
 
 
(0.00102) (0.00360) (0.00348) (0.00540) (0.0454) (0.0212) 
Openness to trade -0.00543 0.0201 -0.0128 -0.00789 -0.0920 -0.00149 
 
 
(0.0137) (0.0356) (0.0286) (0.0168) (0.0943) (0.0425) 
Population 0.0164* 0.0376 -0.000622 -0.0333 0.0858 0.0415 
 
 
(0.00781) (0.0433) (0.0512) (0.0526) (0.0833) (0.0390) 
GDP per capita -0.00717 -0.00995 0.0107 -0.0371 0.207 0.0855 
 
 
(0.00897) (0.0656) (0.0424) (0.0352) (0.112) (0.0581) 
Trawling intensity -0.00396 0.00121 0.0234 0.0112 0.0107 0.0123 
 
 
(0.00491) (0.00894) (0.0210) (0.0146) (0.0274) (0.00706) 
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Constant -0.190 -0.502 0.0912 0.869 -3.023 -2.200 
 (0.167) (0.795) (0.989) (0.709) (1.914) (1.111) 
       
Observations 1,299 543 563 600 219 253 
R-squared 0.002 0.011 0.015 0.009 0.038 0.036 
Number of ccode 82 70 68 59 29 24 
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05. Groups are divided based on GNI per capita in 2010 
constant US dollars. All the independent variables are lagged 1 year. Openness to trade, population, GDP per capita and trawling inten-
sity are log-transformed. 
 
Column 1 presents the results for the countries in the lowest income group, classified by 
the World Bank as low income countries. The results in Column 1 show that the impact of democracy 
on our dependent variable is not significant in countries where the gross national income is below 
1,005 USD per capita. In the lower middle-income group, the picture is a bit more complex. Look-
ing at Column 2, the effect of democracy is negative and significant in the group of countries with a 
GNI between 1,006 and 2,000 USD per capita are included. Yet, another cluster of countries within 
the lower middle-income group, where GNI is between 2,000 and 3,975 USD per capita, display 
insignificant results, as shown in Column 3. 
As presented in Column 4, democracy shows no significant effect on changes in the health 
of the marine environment in the upper middle-income countries. The results indicate that at these 
development stages a country’s level of democracy does not seem to be a strong predictor of the 
subsequent change in the health of its marine environment. However, the results are contrastingly 
different when we proceed to analyze countries with higher levels of economic development. 
Columns 5 and 6 report the results of our analysis for high-income countries with a GNI ex-
ceeding 12,275 USD per capita. It is evident from these results that democracy does not exert a 
significant effect on the marine environment in groups where the GNI per capita is between 12,276 
and 20,000 USD. However, an interesting finding is that a positive and significant effect is visible 
among the countries with a GNI exceeding 20,000 USD per capita. 
In sum, the empirical analysis shows negative effects of democracy in the poorer section of 
the lower middle-income countries, no significant effects in the upper middle-income countries, 
and positive effects in the richest of the high-income countries. In all, this lends some support to 
the theoretical argument made in this article, i.e., that the effect of democracy on the marine envi-
ronment is conditioned by economic development and, more specifically, the institutions that are 
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often missing in low-income settings while they are relatively well established at higher develop-
ment stages.  
The sizes of the effects of our measure of democracy on the changes in MTI are, however, 
generally quite small, yet significant in certain groups of income. Thus, they should be interpreted 
with care. The explained variance is often low in a first difference model, a fact that is evident in 
the tables above. 
 
Conclusions 
With the point of departure in theories about democratic consolidation and sequencing, this article 
argues that the debate over democracy’s virtuous or vicious effects on the environment may be 
partly misinformed. More specifically, we argue that there are substantial reasons to believe that the 
way democracy works – whether it is an instrument for collective action beneficial to the environ-
ment or an instrument for patronage, clientelism and redistribution to the ruler’s closest allies – 
fundamentally depends on level of economic development. As such, we hypothesize that if not 
preceded or accompanied by institutions that generate economic development, democracy may in 
fact not be more than an empty shell, potentially even opening up yet other arenas for exploitation, 
patronage and clientelism.  
These theoretical propositions partly gain support in our empirical investigations. When we 
analyze the effect of democracy on the changes in MTI in the entire sample of 142 countries across 
34 years, we find a negative effect, indicating that democratic regimes tend to have a negative im-
pact on the marine environment. However, we contribute by advancing the analysis to study the 
effect of democracy at different stages of economic development. The strongest and most straight-
forward result is that democracy has a significant negative effect on the health of marine ecosys-
tems during early stages of economic development, but as we climb the income ladder the effect 
turns positive. That is, there are negative effects of democracy in settings of low gross national 
income and positive effects when the economic development has reached a certain threshold. Until 
a country becomes an upper middle-income country, democracy seems to have a negative effect on 
the health of the marine environment, but the effect then turns positive and is significant for the 
richest countries with a GNI per capita exceeding 20,000 USD.  
Although these findings lend support to the theoretical claims about democracy’s different 
effects, future studies ought to look closer into the specific mechanisms producing these outcomes. For 
 17 
example, is it the institutions normally accompanying economic development – such as rule of law 
or property rights protection – that make democracy have different effects during different stages 
of economic development? Or, is it rather economic development per se that affects resource use 
and exploitation patterns in society? That is, while we have strong theoretical reasons to believe that 
democracy is more likely to work as an instrument for collective action in settings where other fun-
damental collective action problems involved in the process of state building and development 
have already been solved, the exact blending, pacing and sequencing of institutional reforms neces-
sary to foster sustainable development and stewardship of natural resources remain to be explored.  
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APPENDIXES.  
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Low-income countries with GNI per capita 
below 1,005 USD  
 
Albania   1986-999 
Algeria   1972-1976 
Angola   1987-2004  
Bangladesh   1974-2006 
Barbados   1972 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   1996 
Brazil   1972-1975 
Solomon Islands   1992-1996, 2000-2006 
Cambodia   1995-2006 
Cameroon   1972-2006 
Cape Verde   1988-1992 
Sri Lanka   1972-2003 
Chile   1975-1977 
China   1972-2001 
Colombia   1972-1979 
Comoros   1983-2006 
Congo   1972-2004 
Congo, Democratic Republic   1972-2006 
Costa Rica   1972- 1976, 1982 
Benin   1972-2006 
Dominica   1979-1980 
Dominican Republic   1972-1980, 1986-1991 
Ecuador   1972-1992 
El Salvador   1972-1991 
Equatorial Guinea   1987-1999 
Eritrea   1994-2004 
Fiji   1972-1975 
Djibouti   1992-2005 
Gabon   1972-1973 
Georgia   1994-2003 
Gambia   1972-2006 
Ghana   1972-2006 
Kiribati   1978-1992 
Grenada   1979 
Guatemala   1972-1991 
Guinea   1986-2006 
Guyana   1972-2004 
Honduras   1972-2000 
 
 
 
Kenya   1972-2006 
Korea, South   1972-1977 
Liberia   1972-2006 
Madagascar   1972-2006 
Malta   1972 
Mauritania   1972-2006 
Mauritius   1978  
Mexico 1972 -1973  
Morocco   1972-1990 
Mozambique   1983-2006 
Oman   1972-1974 
Vanuatu   1981-1989 
Nicaragua   1972-2006 
Nigeria   1972-2006 
Pakistan 1973-2006 
Panama   1972-1975 
Papua New Guinea   1975-2006 
Peru   1972- 1990 
Philippines   1972-1994 
Guinea-Bissau   1974-2006 
Timor-Leste   2006 
St Vincent and the Grenadines    1979-1983 
Sao Tome and Principe   2005-2006 
Senegal   1980-2006 
Seychelles   1976-1977 
Sierra Leone   1972-2006 
Vietnam   1989-2006 
Somalia   1979-1990 
South Africa   1973 
Sudan   1972-2006 
Suriname   1992 
Syria   1972-2000 
Thailand   1972-1987 
Togo   1972-2006 
Tonga   1983-1988 
Trinidad and Tobago   1972 
Tunisia   1972-1979 
Ukraine   1995-2003 
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India   1972-2006 
Iran   1972-1974 
Cote d'Ivoire   1972-2006 
Jamaica   1972-1986 
Jordan   1977 
 
Egypt   1972-1996 
Tanzania   1990-2006 
Uruguay   1972-1973 
Samoa   1984-1994 
Yemen   1992-2006 
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Low middle-income countries with GNI per 
capita between 1,005 and 2,000 USD per 
capita 
 
Albania   2000-2003 
Algeria 1977-2003 
Angola   2005-2006 
Antigua and Barbuda 1981 
Argentina   1972-1978 
Barbados   1973- 1977 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   1997- 2002 
Brazil   1976-1988 
Belize   1981-1989 
Solomon Islands    1997-1999 
Bulgaria   1985-2002 
Cape Verde   1993-2004 
Sri Lanka   2004-2006 
Chile   1972-1974, 1978-1989 
China   2002- 2005 
Colombia   1980-1994 
Congo   1983-2006 
Costa Rica   1977-1988 
Dominican Republic   1981-1995 
Ecuador   1979-2003 
El Salvador   1992-1999 
Equatorial Guinea   2000-2001 
Fiji   1976-1992 
Djibouti   2006 
Gabon   1974 
Georgia   2004-2006 
Kiribati   1993-2006 
Greece   1972 
Grenada   1986- 1989 
Guatemala   1980-2004 
Guyana   2005- 2006 
Honduras   2001-2006 
Iran   1975-2003 
Ireland   1972 
Jamaica   1975- 1994 
Jordan   1978- 2002 
 
 
 
 
Korea, South   1978-1981 
Lebanon   1990-1993 
Latvia   1994 
Lithuania   1994 
Maldives   1997-1998 
Malta   1973-1977 
Mauritius   1979-1988 
Mexico   1974-1988 
Morocco   1991-2005 
Oman   1975 
Namibia   1989-2002 
Vanuatu   1990-2006 
Panama   1976-1989 
Papua New Guinea   1993-1996 
Peru   1981-2001 
Philippines   1995-2006 
Poland   1992 
Portugal   1972-1976 
Romania   1989-2002 
St Kitts and Nevis   1981-1984 
St Lucia   1983-1988 
Seychelles   1978-1981 
Singapore   1972-1974 
South Africa   1974-1979 
Spain   1972-1973 
Suriname   1977-2002 
Syria   1978-2006 
Thailand   1988-2002 
Tonga   1989-2005 
Trinidad and Tobago   1973-1975 
Tunisia   1980- 1995, 2002 
Ukraine   1994, 2004-2006 
Egypt   1997-2006 
Uruguay   1974-1987 
Venezuela   1972-1974 
Samoa   1990-2004 
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Appendix 1. Cont. 
 
 
Low middle-income countries with GNI per 
capita between 2,000 and 3,975 USD  
 
Albania   2004-2006 
Algeria   1981-2006 
Argentina   1974-2004 
Australia   1972 
Bahamas   1973-1978 
Barbados   1978-1983 
Belgium   1972 
Bosnia and Herzegovina   2003-2006 
Brazil   1989-1995, 1999-2005 
Belize   1990-2006 
Bulgaria   1983-2006 
Cape Verde   2005-2002 
Croatia   1993-1995 
Denmark   1972 
Dominica   1994-2003 
Dominican Republic   1996-2006 
Ecuador   2004-2006 
El Salvador   2000-2005 
Equatorial Guinea   2002-2004 
Estonia   1991-1999 
Fiji   1993-2006 
Finland   1972-1973 
France   1972 
Gabon   1975-2003 
Greece   1973-1977 
Grenada   1990-2002 
Guatemala   2005-2006 
Iceland   1972 
Iran   1981-2006 
Ireland   1973-1978 
Israel   1972-1978 
Italy   1972-1976 
Jamaica   1995-2005 
Jordan   1983-2006 
Korea, South   1983-1988 
Kuwait   1972-1973 
 
 
 
 
Lebanon   1994-1997 
Latvia   1995-2002 
Lithuania   1995-2002 
Maldives   1999-2006 
Malta   1978-1986 
Mauritius   1989-2002 
Mexico   1980-1997 
Morocco   2006 
Oman   1976-1980 
Namibia   1994-2006 
Netherlands   1972 
New Zealand   1972-1973 
Norway   1972 
Micronesia   1993-2006 
Marshall Islands   1998-2006 
Panama   1983-2003 
Peru   1996-2006 
Poland   1993-1996 
Portugal   1977-1987 
Romania   2003-2005 
St Lucia   1989-2001 
St Vincent and the Grenadines   1995-2005 
Seychelles   1983-1988 
Singapore   1975-1979 
South Africa   1980-2004 
Spain   1974-1978 
Suriname   1979-2006 
Thailand   1993-2006 
Tonga   2006 
Trinidad and Tobago   1976-1995 
Tunisia   1996- 2006 
United Kingdom   1972-1975 
Uruguay   1980-1992 
Venezuela   1975-2003 
Samoa   2005-2006 
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Upper middle-income countries with GNI 
per capita between 3,975 and 12,275 USD  
 
Antigua and Barbuda   1988-2006 
Argentina   1992-2006 
Australia   1973-1988 
Bahamas   1979-1995 
Bahrain   1983-2002 
Barbados   1984-1999, 2002 
Belgium   1973-1987 
Brazil   1996-1999, 2006 
Brunei   1989 
Canada   1972-1983 
Chile   1995-2006  
Costa Rica   2003-2006 
Croatia   1996-2006 
Cyprus   1983-1994 
Denmark   1973-1979, 1983-1985 
Equatorial Guinea   2005-2006 
Estonia   2000-2006 
Finland   1974-1986 
France   1973-1986 
Gabon   1976-2006 
 Greece   1978-1981, 1983-1995 
Grenada   2003-2006 
Iceland   1973-1979, 1982, 1984-1985 
Ireland   1979-1991 
Israel   1979-1992 
Italy   1977-1987 
Jamaica   2006 
Korea, South   1989-2002 
Kuwait   1974-1975 
Lebanon   1998-2006 
 
 
 
 
Latvia   2003-2006 
Libya   2002-2006 
Lithuania   2003-2006 
Malta   1987-2003 
Mauritius   2003-2006 
Mexico   1993-2006 
Montenegro   2006 
Oman   1981-2006 
Netherlands   1973-1986 
New Zealand   1974-1993 
Norway   1973- 1979 
Palau   1994-2006 
Panama   2004-2006 
Poland   1997-2006 
Portugal   1988-2002 
Romania   2006 
St Kitts and Nevis   1995-2006 
St Lucia   1999-2006 
St Vincent and the Grenadines   2006 
Seychelles   1989-2006 
Singapore   1980-1990 
Slovenia   1992-2002 
South Africa   2005-2006 
Spain   1979-1990 
Sweden   1972-1978 
Trinidad and Tobago   1980-2005 
United Arab Emirates   1975 
United Kingdom   1976-1987 
Uruguay   1993-2006 
Venezuela   1981-1983, 2000-2006 
 
 
 
 
  
 27 
Appendix 1. Cont. 
 
High-income countries with GNI per capita 
between 12,275 and 20,000 USD  
 
Australia   1989-1995, 2001-2002 
Bahamas   1996-2004 
Bahrain   2003-2006 
Belgium   1988-1991 
Brunei   1990-2004 
Canada   1984-1992 
Cyprus   1995-2004 
Denmark   1980-1988 
Finland   1987-1988, 1993-1994 
France   1987-1990 
Germany   1990 
Greece   1996-2004 
Iceland   1980-1981, 1983, 1986-1987 
Ireland   1992-1996 
Israel   1993-2004 
Italy   1988- 1991, 1994-1995, 2002 
Korea, South   2003-2006 
Kuwait   1976-2002 
Malta   2004-2006 
Netherlands   1987-1991 
New Zealand   1994-2003 
Norway   1980-1987 
Portugal   2003-2006 
Singapore   1991-1993 
Slovenia   2003-2006 
Spain   1991-2003 
Sweden   1979-1987 
Trinidad and Tobago   2006 
United Arab Emirates   1976, 1978, 1982, 1985-
1996, 1998-2000 
United Kingdom   1988-1995 
 
 
High-income countries with GNI per capita 
above 20,000 USD  
 
Australia   1996-2000, 2003-2006 
Bahamas   2005-2006 
Belgium   1992-2006 
Brunei   2005-2006 
Canada   1993-2006 
Cyprus   2005-2006 
Denmark   1989-2006 
Finland   1989-1992, 1995-2006 
France   1991-2006 
Germany   1991-2006 
Greece   2005-2006 
Iceland   1988-2006 
Ireland   1997-2006 
Israel   2005-2006 
Italy   1992-2006 
Kuwait   2003-2006 
Netherlands   1992-2006 
New Zealand   2004-2006 
Norway   1988-2006 
Singapore   1994-2006 
Spain   2004-2006 
Sweden   1988-2006 
United Arab Emirates   1977, 1979-1981, 1983-
1984, 1997, 2001-2004 
United Kingdom   1996-2006 
 
 
 
